Yesterday,
hockey fans witnessed the remarkable sight of National Hockey
League commissioner Gary Bettman and NHL Players Association
head Bob Goodenow standing on the edge of their respective
precipices -- and jumping. We all saw them go off the edge,
we lamented, expressed disgust, and perhaps even peered over.
But we didn't leap too. The NHL and NHLPA alone jumped, and
Canada's hockey fans, who are alive and well, must now decide
what this means to them for the future.
To understand fully what took place yesterday, one needs to
look at the historical context, and how the dispute's two
parties managed to go so wrong.
As
with most conflicts, this one was a long time in the making.
Back in the early 1990s, the 21-team league was on relatively
solid footing and poised to grow. The way to go was seen as
expansion into new, non-traditional hockey markets. The Mason-Dixon
line, the United States' historical north/south divide, no
longer seemed an obstacle. The NHL eagerly eyed future generations
of hockey fans in cities where the only ice folks saw was
in the bottoms of their drinking glasses. That the Atlanta
Flames had moved to Calgary in the 1980s due to a poor southern
market was viewed as irrelevant by the new NHL marketing machine.
It was thought that a national U.S. footprint for the NHL
would lead to significant increases in television revenues;
there'd be no stopping the NHL and its goal of supplanting
basketball as the No. 3 professional sport in the United States.
Outside of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, Canadian NHL teams
were being snapped up by savvy U.S.-based sports entrepreneurs;
the Winnipeg Jets moved to Phoenix, and the Quebec Nordiques
moved to Colorado.
But the millions of dollars in expansion revenues that were
suddenly flowing into teams weren't being used to pay down
team debt or make long-term investments. Instead, most teams
used the money to spend on ever-higher player salaries. It
was as if a rich uncle had left the league a windfall -- but
instead of paying off the mortgage, or repairing cracked foundations,
the inheritance was squandered on Porsches and Jags. This
went on for years, in effect leaving teams with fleets of
aging cars -- parked in leaky garages. Unfortunately for the
NHL, when teams hit 30 in number, there were no more easy
(and unearned) sources of revenue to put toward player salaries.
In order to supplement expansion revenues and maintain the
ability to pay for new players, NHL teams also went on an
unprecedented arena-building boom. They did this assuming
that they could increase the corporate "fan" base
by cramming in as many luxury suites and premium seats as
possible. Jumbotrons and National Basketball Association-style
entertainment became de rigueur; more is more became the mantra.
Meanwhile,
traditional hockey fans, shut out by high ticket prices, attended
fewer games and started to connect to the game via the television.
Players came and went on the local team, rarely staying off-season
in the NHL city where they played.
What does this mean for teams and managers now?
The
NHL must regain the respect and commitment of hockey fans.
As for the fans themselves, when the NHL gets back on track
next fall, they should act as if they're from the home state
of the St. Louis Blues: Missouri, the "show me"
state. Fans should insist that players get more involved in
the city where they earn their NHL salary. And they should
insist NHL team owners pass on salary savings by lowering
ticket prices.
We know that NHL hockey will be back. What it will look like
is up to hockey fans. That's because the fans are still on
solid ground, not hurtling down with Mr. Bettman and Mr. Goodenow.
The fans now have the chance to reclaim our game.
Bob
Stellick, who worked in the Toronto Maple Leafs organization
from 1985 to 1997, runs a sports marketing consultancy.
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